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Abstract 
 
Evidence exists that welfare recipients migrate between states to seek more generous benefits, 
potentially leading states to lower AFDC benefits to avoid such welfare migration.  Taken 
further, this raises the specter of states competitively lowering benefits in reaction to similar 
moves by other states. The naïve model of policymaking assumes that benefits are solely a 
function of state characteristics.  If benefits depend on the threat of welfare migration or other 
interstate competition, however, one must account for possible spillovers. This paper presents 
tests for the presence of welfare-policy spillovers in a panel of 47 states over the period 1979-
1995.  I find weak evidence of spillovers even in the presence of state fixed effects and political 
and budgetary-control variables.
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I.  Introduction 
 The primary cash support program for poor Americans is Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF), long called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).1  
AFDC was financed jointly by states and the federal government. States set income and asset 
limits within federal guidelines, set maximum benefit levels, and administer the program (Hou
of Representatives 1994).  As an entitlement program, every qualified applicant received AFD
benefits.  Congress recently changed AFDC to a federal block-grant program, however, raising 
each state’s marginal cost of benefits by 100% or more.  How will states react?  They may lower 
benefit levels during recessions to avoid extra expenditures, limit the duration of benefits, or 
simply continue the long-term downward trend in real AFDC benefits (House of Representatives 
1994).  They may also try to pass off some of the additional cost to federally financed programs 
such as Food Stamps and Medicaid.
se 
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 The rise in marginal benefit cost also puts states in potential competition.  Because the 
poor may migrate, there is an increased incentive for states to engage in a tit-for-tat reduction of 
benefits in an attempt to discourage in-migration of other states’ poor.     
To learn how states will react to the new funding scheme, we must understand what 
determines state benefit levels. This paper extends the literature on benefit determination by 
testing for interstate policy spillovers in the presence of a wide array of political-party and 
budgetary controls.  It also determines whether the apparent effect of these variables is due to 
unobserved state-specific factors.  I find that states do adjust their own welfare benefits in 
1 Throughout I will refer to AFDC as it was structured during the period of the study (1979-1995) and not to its 
replacement, TANF. 
2 Regarding Food Stamps, see Orr (1979), Hulten and others (1982), Gramlich (1982), and Plotnick and Winters 
(1985).  Although results have been mixed, the most recent study finds evidence in favor of such substitution 
(Moffitt 1990).  For similar evidence concerning Medicaid, see Coughlin and others (1994).    
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response to those of contiguous neighboring states.  This spillover effect is not consistent, 
however, with the large-scale benefit reductions that some have predicted (Peterson and Rom 
1989). Less-populous states, and those historically gaining the most poor people through 
migration, theoretically should be the most sensitive to welfare migration.  Even these states do 
not show a clear pattern of spillovers in state welfare policymaking, however.  I conclude that 
welfare migration is not a prominent concern of legislators in most states. 
Theories of Benefit-Setting   
 Models of welfare by economists are usually based on the interdependent utility model of 
Orr (1976) in which state residents are either taxpayers or poor. While the poor care only for 
their own income, taxpayers are altruistic and care about both groups.  Because everyone values 
the poor's income, its transfer-induced rise is a public good. 
Several other explanations for the existence of welfare also have been suggested, 
including income security for the nonpoor (Varian 1980) and securing electoral support 
(Peltzman 1980).  Welfare may result from competition among political parties (Key 1949; 
Kasper 1971; Jennings 1979; Plotnick and Winters 1985, 1990) or pressure from interest groups 
(Becker 1983; Plotnick 1986).   
Several studies have found that when the poor move, they are more likely than the 
nonpoor to move to states with higher benefit levels (Southwick 1981; Gramlich and Laren 
1984; Blank 1988).  A recent study of migration between border counties of several sets of 
adjacent states similarly finds evidence of welfare migration (Walker 1996).   Migration of the 
poor may depend on other factors, of course, such as personal circumstances of recipients 
(Allard and Danziger 1997). 
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In current policy discussions, the term "race to the bottom" is applied to the notion that 
states may competitively lower AFDC benefit levels in order to encourage potential recipients to 
move away, as well as to discourage in-migration of other states’ poor.  In both cases, the goal is 
to reduce state welfare costs.  This has only recently been subjected to empirical testing by 
Scheve and others (1996), who find weak support for the thesis.  This paper improves on their 
analysis by controlling for a wider range of factors in benefit-setting.  It also reports results from 
two models that further test the effect of state population on spatial spillovers in benefits.   
 The next section derives an appropriate utility function for benefit setting, that of state 
legislators.  In Section 3 I detail how the spatial spillover theory may be tested.  The data and 
models are discussed in Section 4, followed by estimation results in Section 5.  Section 6 
presents the two additional models to test the spatial spillover hypothesis.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
II.  Modeling Legislators’ Utility 
 
 Political scientists have long debated the role of the party system in determining aid to 
the poor.  Key (1949) first suggested that the poor would fare better in states with active 
competition among parties.  Jennings (1979) modified this, arguing that party competition only 
aids the poor if parties split along class lines.  Orr (1976) follows what political scientists label 
the party convergence theory: under certain conditions, parties converge to the preferred policy 
of the median voter (Downs 1957).  When such convergence does not occur--the current 
American situation--it may be that stable, long-standing differences exist among parties.  The 
basic premise of interparty competition theories is that the party in power implements its 
preferred policies (Jennings 1979; Plotnick and Winters 1985, 1990).   
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 In the public good model, taxpaying (nonpoor) citizens demand welfare transfers in order 
to raise their own utility.  Orr (1976) further assumes that the actual level of transfers is 
determined by majority vote.  Implicitly he assumes that lawmakers follow the dictates of voters, 
but this is likely to be untrue.  Politicians are not constrained to follow voters' desires, and 
citizens cannot directly reveal their welfare preferences through a vote.  Nor can general 
elections be construed as mandates on welfare, since they could equally be mandates on taxes or 
highway speed limits.   
 One modification of the electoral school of politics ascribes a greater role to politicians' 
own preferences.  State legislators choose policies according to their own interests, but within 
boundaries or constraints of public opinion (Oberlander 1995).  Because state legislators set 
AFDC benefit levels (and thereby the sum of AFDC and Food Stamps), it makes sense to model 
their utility.  I hypothesize that it is a function the perceived chances of reelection (E), the 
income of the poor (Yp), and preferences about the welfare system or its recipients (Ts):  
 
(2) Us = U(E; Yp; T), 
 
where s indexes the state.  Legislators are assumed to know the value of other states' benefits, as 
well as economic and demographic information about their own states. 
 Likelihood of reelection is assumed to be a function of household income and public 
support for the current benefit levels, both of which would be affected by changes in benefits.  A 
natural measure of income is state per-capita income.  Although they clearly affect income, tax 
rates should be avoided in general.  They are set by legislators concurrently with welfare benefits 
and so cannot be treated as exogenous variables.   
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 The unemployment rate may also figure into reelection chances.  Suppose that a weak 
economy hurts incumbents at the polls.  A politician may react to high unemployment by seeking 
to cushion the impact of job loss through higher transfers, including welfare payments.  
Alternatively, legislators may wish to avoid budget overruns.  In the face of higher 
unemployment – and hence higher demand for welfare – they may decide to lower benefits.   
 Next, I assume legislators directly gain utility from raising the income of the poor.  
Raising Yp may also increase legislators’ utility indirectly by encouraging electoral support 
(Peltzman 1980).      
 Preference term T is added for several reasons.  There is deep disagreement as to whether 
raising welfare benefits is the proper way to raise Yp.  The utility function must be able to 
accommodate a desire to raise Yp and a simultaneous desire to lower welfare benefits.  
Otherwise, there would be no way to explain lower benefits except through electoral politics.  If 
welfare recipients as a group are politically unpopular, this will also be captured in T.  Moffitt 
and others (1996) find the long-term fall in benefits to relate to a similar fall in the bottom of the 
real wage distribution, consistent with the theory that the nonpoor (or politicians) desire not just 
to aid the poor but also to maintain a consistent work incentive for them.   
 All politicians in a state are assumed to have the same utility function, so T becomes a 
measure of state (or even regional) preferences, whether political or social in nature.  I improve 
on the traditional regional dummies by estimating models with state fixed effects and by 
allowing interaction between the Southeast-state dummy and the political variables. 
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III.  Spatial Autocorrelation 
 
 
 If we suppose that states are affected by the policies of neighboring states, we must ask 
how “neighbor” is defined.  When the primary concern is welfare migration, it is natural to 
define neighborhood geographically.3 I will do so here, labeling a state as another state’s 
neighbor if the two share a common border.  
 To create a weighted average of the benefit levels in contiguous states, there must be a 
matrix containing the weights assigned to each state relative to each other state.  Call this NxN 
weight matrix W, where N is 47, the number of states.  Each row of W corresponds to a single 
state.  The matrix W will be row standardized, meaning that the sum of weights for each row is 
1.  At first each contiguous state will have equal weight, while all noncontiguous states have 
weight 0.  
 Consider two examples.   In Florida's row of W, the columns corresponding to Georgia, 
Alabama, and Mississippi each have a weight of 1/3, while all other columns contain 0.  
Similarly, in the row corresponding to Maine, the column for New Hampshire has a value of 1 
while all other columns contain zeros.  Thus W*Bt-1,s' is the weighted average value of welfare 
benefits in contiguous states, where Bt-1  is the Nx1 matrix of 
welfare benefits in each state in year t-1.  Neighboring state benefits are lagged relative to the 
dependent state's (hence subscript t-1) since benefits are set a year in advance.  Thus when 
estimating the Maine benefit for 1986, one would consider New Hampshire's 1985 benefit. 
                                                          
3 Policymaking may follow other neighborhood patterns, however.  In a study of state expenditures, Case and others 
(1993) find that defining neighborhood by the percentage of Black residents best fits their data.  On auto emissions, 
a group of Northeastern states simultaneously adopted California's strict controls. 
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 Applying equal weight to each neighboring state is an arbitrary choice.  It is more 
plausible to weight the states based on their relative populations, such that larger contiguous 
states receive more weight than smaller ones.  This makes sense if states are concerned about 
population flows, since larger states are larger potential sources of  migratory poor people.  
Models with this alternative set of population weights will be estimated as well. 
 One shortcoming of these spatial models is that when considering the benefits of an 
individual state, they take the other states’ benefit levels as fixed.  A possibility unexplored here 
is a game-theoretic model of benefit-setting among states.  Brown and Oates (1987) derive a 
simple two-state general equilibrium model in which each state’s benefits depend partly on 
welfare migration from the other state, based on the difference in benefits between the two.  
They find that an increase in mobility of the poor will typically decrease the average benefit 
level of the two states.  Figlio and others (1997) develop a game-theoretic model that implies 
that states should react more to decreases in neighboring states' benefits than to increases.  Using 
a panel of state data from 1983-1994, they find evidence that supports their hypothesis.  Smith 
(1991) presents a model in which state legislators consider the income, previous benefits and 
other features of other states when setting their own benefit levels.  She finds that states do take 
into account the features of others within a 750-mile radius.    
 These game-theoretic models have two shortcomings.  They rely on strong assumptions 
about the structure of preferences to obtain reaction functions.  Even when the data seem 
consistent with the model, as in Figlio and others (1997), it is unclear whether the data would 
also support models with substantially different reaction functions.  This matters if the goal of 
estimating reaction functions is to find the theoretic equilibrium of the game.  A second 
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difficulty is that game-theoretic models to date generally lack measures of political-party control 
or fiscal constraints, thereby ignoring a potentially important set of determinants.          
Spatial autocorrelation models may be misleading in that a spatial effect may appear due 
to omitted variables.  That is, states in a region may simultaneously react to similar economic (or 
other) variables not included in the regression.  Given the similarity of benefit levels year to 
year, this could lead to a spurious finding of spatial correlation across states.  I handle this in two 
ways.  First, I explicitly test for spatial dependence in the error terms and find that I cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of no dependence; this will be detailed in the following section.  Second, to 
avoid any remaining regional correlation I use predicted benefit values in place of real values in 
building the weighting average benefit matrices in equations (3.c), (3.e) and (3.f). 
 
 IV.   Models 
 
 
I model the underlying data-generating function in equation (3.1).  Equations (3.2) 
 and (3.3) allow for various assumptions about the error term in (3.1). 
 
(3.1)   Bs,t   =  βXs,t-1  +  ρLWLBs',t-1  +   ρHWHBs’,t-1   +   γtt   +   ηss   +  εs,t , 
(3.2)    εs,t  =   λsWεs',t-1  + δs,t  ,          
(3.3)          E[δi,j, δk,l] =  Ω,      
 
The analysis includes 47 states for the period 1979-1995.4  Equation (3.1) models benefit 
levels as a function of own-state characteristics in the previous year (Xs,t-1).5  Equation (3.1) also 
                                                          
4 Alaska and Hawaii are omitted because they lack contiguous neighbors.  The District of Columbia and Nebraska 
are omitted because they lack partisan, bicameral legislatures. 
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lets benefit levels in neighboring states (Bs',t-1) to have a spillover effect.   Weighting matrices 
WL and WH allow lower-benefit and higher-benefit neighbors to have separate spillover effects.6  
They each incorporate either the equal or population-based weighting assumptions described in 
Section III.  Vector t includes 16 year dummies to account for national trends in benefit levels 
(1995 is omitted). 
Alternative Assumptions about the Model 
Equations (3.1)-(3.3) can incorporate a large number of testable restrictions.  In this 
section I discuss a number of these and the resulting models tested. 
Due to the possibility of unobserved state characteristics correlated with welfare 
generosity, equation (3.1) includes s, a vector of 47 state dummies.  Even in the presence of state 
fixed effects, apparent spillovers may simply reflect regional movements in state benefits.  I 
therefore estimate models with three variants: no state fixed effects; state fixed effects; and 
region fixed effects, in which I restrict the state dummies to be constant within each of 9 regions 
defined by the Census Bureau.  The t-statistic reveals the value 
 of adding either kind of state effect, while an F-test assesses the importance of the 
distinguishing between region and state fixed effects. 
Equation (3.2) models autocorrelation in the error term of (3.1).  The term Wεs',t-1  
allows for spatial dependence in the error term reflecting “spatial autocorrelation in measurement 
errors or in variables that are otherwise not crucial to the model,” such as omitted variables 
(Anselin 1996).  Alternatively I can restrict W to be the identity matrix, yielding first-order 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 See Appendix 1 for definitions and descriptive statistics. 
 
6 The weighting matrices WH and WL vary by state and year, but these subscripts are omitted for notational clarity. 
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(temporal) autocorrelation in the residuals.   Tests for spatial autocorrelation are discussed in the 
next section. 
Explicitly modeling state fixed effects may still leave a state-specific component in the 
error terms.  In order to capture any such differences, equation (3.1) should be estimated with 
heteroskedastic errors. What if the apparent similarity of contiguous states’ policies simply 
reflects omitted regional economic circumstances?  One solution is to restrict the state dummies 
to be regional dummies, as mentioned above.  Another method would estimate a covariance 
matrix in which E[δi,t , δk,t] = σik.  The number of estimated covariance parameters would be 
(47*48)/2 or 1128, however, which is more than the 799 observations available.    I therefore 
restrict the covariance matrix Ω to allow nonzero state variances but zero covariances: 
 
(3.3')          Ωii = σi ,    Ωik =  0   
 
The Gauss-Markov theorem states that OLS is optimal only if, among other 
requirements, the independent variables are uncorrelated with the error term.  If in the true model 
the spatial coefficients ρL or ρH is nonzero, OLS estimation of equation (3.1)  
is biased and inconsistent (Anselin 1988; Case 1991).  The difficulty arises from the presence of 
a spatially lagged value of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation, which is 
correlated with the error term.  This can be overcome through the method of instrumental 
variables.  
The choice of instruments is determined by the assumptions made about the source of 
correlation.  If it reflects factors fixed over the duration of the study, it will be absorbed by the 
state fixed effects but not by region effects.  Region-specific factors that are constant will be 
removed by either state or region fixed effects.   Fixed factors may also be instrumented through 
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time-varying regressors that correlate with own-state benefits but not with neighbors' benefits.  
Another possibility is that potential endogeneity reflects time-varying unobserved factors that 
change substantially over over the period of the study.  In this case time-varying instruments 
must be used.   
I test two-stage least squares models under several different assumptions.  The first is a 
naive model that assumes no endogeneity, so lagged neighbors' benefits (Bs’,t-1) are used directly.  
The remaining models include either state or region fixed effects, alternately accounting for 
potential time-invariant sources of correlation.  I also instrument lagged neighbors' benefits with 
neighbors' other characteristics lagged an additional year: 
 
(3.4)  Bs,t-1   =  ϕXs,t-2  +  υs,t     , 
 
where the error term υs,t is assumed to be distributed Normal with mean zero.7  The 
identification here comes from the presumed correlation between a state's benefit levels  
                                                          
and its economic and political conditions of the prior year. I include dummy variables to denote 
the year within the gubernatorial cycle, as well as others for the political control of the state 
legislature and governorship, all of which should be unrelated to any regional economic trends 
not found in per-capita income and unemployment.  The instruments perform well.  The F-
statistic for joint significance of all regressors is highly significant (F=29.3, p < .001), as is the F-
statistic for the subset of political variables described above (F=11.6, p < .01).    Equation (3.1) 
may therefore be rewritten to take account of this two-stage method: 
 
7 I adjust the second-stage standard errors to account for the additional error caused by the use of a predicted 
regressor.  See Murphy and Topel (1985).    
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(3.1')    Bs,t   =  βXs,t-1  +  ρLWLBs',t-1  +   ρHWHBs’,t-1   +   γtt   +   ηss   +  εs,t , 
 
 
where Bs,t refers to instrumented benefits in state s in year t.   
Testing for Spatial Autocorrelation 
 Among several tests for spatial autocorrelation, the most common is Moran’s I (Moran 
1950b; see Case 1991 for details).  Referring to equations (3.1) and (3.2), the joint null 
hypothesis is ρL = ρH = λ = 0.  It was performed once using the equal-weighting scheme and 
again with the population-based weights.  In both cases I could reject the null at the 99%-
confidence level.  This suggests that there is considerable spatial autocorrelation of some form in 
my data.  I then employed a Lagrange Multiplier test of the hypothesis λ = 0 (Anselin and Bera 
1996).  The test did not reject the null hypothesis at the 90% confidence level, so I will assume 
that there is no spatial dependence in the error term.  I still allow for first-order autocorrelation, 
however, so that equation (3.2) may be rewritten as follows: 
 
(3.2')   εs,t  =   rsεs,t-1  + δs,t . 
 
 
The presence of autocorrelated errors suggests an iterative procedure to obtain the greatest 
efficiency.8 
 I expect that both ρL and ρH will be positive, with ρH being significantly smaller.   If its 
neighbors raise their benefits, a state has some freedom to raise its own benefits without 
increasing the risk of welfare migration.  As well, if a neighbor lowers its benefits, there is 
                                                          
8 Briefly, the process is as follows: benefit levels are predicted using exogenous variables.  Using these predicted 
values, OLS estimates of the primary equation are computed.  The resulting errors are used to obtain a first estimate 
of the autocorrelation coefficients rs .  The Prais-Winsten transformation is carried out using rs, and then FGLS is 
done to allow for heteroskedasticity.  The errors of these new estimates are used to obtain the next estimates of rs , 
which are employed in a new transformation of the data, and so on. 
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incentive for a state to lower its own.  In both cases the correlation is positive between the 
direction of change in own benefits and neighbor’s benefits. The value of separating high- and 
low-benefit states will be assessed through F-tests of the difference between ρL and ρH.  If they 
are similar in magnitude and sign it would suggest that high- and low-benefit states need not be 
treated separately.   
 The spatial-autoregressive models will be estimated alternately with equal weights and 
with population-based weights.  In all cases year fixed effects are included.  In models that also 
include state fixed effects, time-invariant variables may not be included.  The goal is to reveal 
the extent to which the partial correlation of the exogenous variables and benefits actually 
reflects underlying unobserved variables across the states.  
Explanatory Variables 
 The primary economic variable in these models is annual per-capita state income.  
Because the federal matching rate for AFDC (and Medicaid) was based on per-capita  income, it 
is a measure of the cost of providing benefits.  It also measures the ability of  
the state’s residents to support benefits through taxes.  The state share of AFDC spending for 
each state will not be included separately, since it is highly correlated with per-capita  
income.9 It also changes little over time, so most variation would be washed out by the state 
fixed effects.   
 Due to federal matching, one would expect per-capita income to have a negative effect on 
AFDC benefits: higher income leads to a higher price-per-dollar.  Yet every study has found per-
capita income to have a positive coefficient (e.g., Orr 1976; Ribar and Wilhelm 1994; Scheve 
                                                          
9 As of 1981, all but two states used the Medicaid formula based on per-capita income.  The state share is 
.45*(Y/Z)2, where Y is per-capita state income and Z is the national average per-capita income.  The minimum state 
share is .17, the maximum .50.   
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and others 1996).  This may occur for several reasons.  Wealthier states can collect greater tax 
revenues, and they may have fewer recipients to support.  There may also be an unobserved 
preference for higher welfare benefits in wealthier states.  Or it may be that poorer states have a 
taste for less government support.  Whatever the reason, the positive (and statistically 
significant) effect of per-capita income on benefit levels is the most regular empirical finding in 
this literature.    
 I include the unemployment rate since higher unemployment increases the number of 
welfare recipients.   If  lawmakers  primarily wish  to  hold  down  costs,  one  
would expect them to lower benefits in response, leading to a negative coefficient.  If instead 
their goal were to cushion job-losers during a bad economy, a positive coefficient would result.   
In order to provide a more thorough analysis of the political economy of welfare benefits 
than has been found in earlier papers, I include a number of measures of state political control.  
The first is a dummy variable signifying that the state legislature and governorship are both 
controlled by Democrats (see Appendix A for details). Unified and divided governments may 
react differently to economic factors as well as demographic.  Alt and Lowry (1994) and Roubini 
and Sachs (1989) study the impact of party control on budget deficits at the state and federal 
levels.   Both find that divided governments are more likely to run deficits than are those with 
single-party control.  
 A considerable political science literature has studied whether the poor fare better under 
Democrat regimes, and why this pattern seems not to hold in the South (Key 1949; Jennings 
1979; Dye 1984; Erikson and others 1989; Brown 1995).  One explanation is that the effect of 
Democrat control may not be positive once one controls for other major factors.  A dummy 
variable may not capture the true effect of political control, however, so I also add measures for 
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the percentage of each house of the state government that is held by Democrats.   All else equal, 
I expect stronger Democratic control to be correlated with higher welfare benefits.10   If Jennings 
(1979) is correct, the traditional lack of party competition in Southeastern states should lead to 
worse outcomes for the poor.  To test the theory that Southern states react differently to party 
control than do others, I allow Southeastern states to have separate interactions with the political 
control variables.11  
 Two demographic variables analyzed are the percentage of Blacks and the percentage of 
people aged 65 or older.  I expect the latter to be negatively correlated with welfare benefit 
levels because the nonelderly poor and the elderly compete for state social-service dollars.  
Blacks are poorer on average than Whites, and so a higher proportion of Blacks will tend to 
mean a higher number of welfare recipients.  The eventual impact on welfare benefits is 
ambiguous, however; states could react either by lowering benefits to keep spending constant or 
by raising benefits to help more people.   At the simplest political level, Blacks may have less 
political clout or be deemed less worthy of support, leading to a negative coefficient on the 
proportion of Blacks.  In order to allow a more complex relationship, I interact each state's 
proportion of Black population with the political control variables.  Again, Jennings (1979) 
implies that there will be a positive correlation between benefits and the proportion of Blacks 
only in states with substantial competition between parties.   
                                                          
10 Political party labels do not necessarily carry the same meaning across states or over time.  Measures of average 
state political ideology, as in Wright, Erickson and McIver (1985), would be preferable but are not regularly 
collected.   
 
11 South (or Southeastern) refers to the following states:  Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, 
North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, West Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky. 
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 A measure of the state’s fiscal condition is also included: the ratio of per-capita state debt 
to per-capita personal income. States may reduce spending on welfare as their debts and deficits 
rise relative to their tax bases, corresponding to an expected negative coefficient on the debt-to-
income ratio. 
 Three variables measure budgetary restrictions on the governor and the legislators.  
Gubernatorial budget authority is measured by the presence of a line-item veto, and by the ability 
to reduce appropriations bills unilaterally when coupled with a line-item veto.  More authority in 
the governor's hands is expected to reduce welfare benefits, since governors are hypothesized to 
face less scrutiny on this issue than local representatives.  The ability to carry expected deficits 
over to the next year will be associated with higher benefits if it allows state governments to 
avoid benefit reduction in lean years.   The effect of these variables on states’ general funds is 
considered in Bohn and Inman (1996).  They find “tentative evidence” that line item vetoes lead 
to lower deficits, and stronger evidence that rules disallowing carryover have substantial effects 
on state budgets.  The influence of governors is also at stake in the final three variables, which 
measure the extent of gubernatorial political cycles.  If governors attempt to vary tax rates and 
spending over their terms to maximize their chances of reelection, the coefficients will be 
significant.  Their signs are unclear in theory, however, since spending more and spending less 
are both ways to win electoral support.   
 
  V.  Estimation Results   
 
 
 In this section I discuss estimation results.  In order to make them concrete, Table 4 
illustrates the dollar-value of the impact of per-capita income and of the spatial spillover terms, 
and their implied elasticities.  Besides the national average effects, I also focus on three 
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particular states: Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin.  They are of particular interest for several 
reasons.   First, they are geographically contiguous, meaning each state's benefit levels will have 
the chance to affect the other two state's benefits in my models.   Second, there has been much 
debate in Wisconsin about welfare migration from the Chicago area.  Finally, Walker's (1996) 
study found evidence of welfare migration between border counties of Wisconsin and its 
neighbors.  Results from estimation of equation (3.1) are found in Table 1; Table 2 includes 
results from equation (3.1'), a 2SLS model that treats neighbors' lagged benefits as endogenous. 
Spatial Autocorrelation Coefficients  
 Table 4 summarizes the spatial coefficients from each model, divided according to the 
weighting scheme used for neighboring states.   The values are small and often insignificant, 
although a few achieve at least the 90% confidence level.  The bottom row of Tables 4.A and 4.B 
shows the results of F-tests of the null hypothesis that the two spatial coefficients are equal.  
Only one case yields a test statistic close to 3.00, the 95% confidence value, implying that we 
may treat all neighboring states jointly.  
 I find only weak support for the welfare migration hypothesis.  The low F-statistics 
contradict it since lower-benefit neighbors should influence own-state benefits more than higher-
benefit neighbors.  The coefficient on lower-benefit neighbors (ρL) also ought to be positive and 
larger than that of higher-benefit neighbors (ρH).  I do find that most coefficients are positive, but 
in half the models ρL is less than ρH, not greater. 
How much do spillovers affect state benefit levels?  Table 5.A provides estimates for 
three states and for the nation as a whole.  Using models with population-based weights, a 5% 
rise in neighboring states' 1994 benefits leads to a rise in own-state benefits of less than $1.25.  
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The implied elasticity of benefits is roughly 3 percent.  These findings imply that spatial 
spillovers are not substantially determining state benefit levels.12   
Economic Variables  
 Economic variables seem to play a substantial role in explaining benefit levels.  The 
variables representing per-capita income are not always individually significant, but F-tests 
reveal joint significance at the 99-percent confidence level.   Table 5.B illustrates the impact on 
1995 benefits of a 1 percent rise in 1994 income.   The implied elasticities range from .18 to .55, 
with a national average of .22 for models that include state fixed effects.  Considering that 
income has risen steadily over the period 1979-1995, we must look to other explanations for the 
long-term downward trend in welfare benefits. 
 The remaining economic variables are often statistically significant as well.    
Unemployment's coefficients are positive and significant but small: a 2% rise would yield less 
than a $5 change in welfare benefits, all else equal.  Its positive sign suggests that state 
governments raise welfare benefits in order to cushion job loss during a recession.  The debt-to-
income ratio, a measure of the state's fiscal condition, is positive in the absence of fixed effects 
but negative with them.  This implies that states with higher debt also have a preference for 
higher benefits, but that within each state higher debt leads to lower spending.   
Political and Demographic Variables 
 Tables 1-3 also report the coefficients of variables measuring legislative party control.   
As discussed earlier, political scientists have long theorized that party control has a different 
effect in the South than in other regions.  In order to capture this possibility, a Southern-state 
                                                          
12 I simulated a counterfactual in which spillovers were allowed to affect other states' benefits in repeated iterations 
while other independent variables were held constant at their 1994 levels.  In most cases it failed to converge.  
Those that did reached convergence within 10 iterations and sustained an average fall in benefits of less than 2-3 
percent.    
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dummy is interacted with the political variables.  The proportion of Blacks, usually measured by 
a single variable, is allowed to have a more complex relationship with welfare as well, again 
through interactions with the political 
variables.   
 Relative to Republican control, I find Democrat control outside the Southeast to be 
associated with roughly a $35 increase in monthly benefits, while divided control leads to a $10 
increase.  The story is reversed in Southeastern states.  There, states with stronger Democrat 
control of the state legislature have lower benefits, supporting Jennings' (1978) theory that it is 
party competition that raises benefits. 
 Overall a higher proportion of Blacks is associated with slightly lower benefits, even 
holding constant Southern region, income, and other factors.  This may reflect a lack of political 
clout among Blacks, or instead a political focus among Blacks on issues besides welfare.  I do 
find support for the interaction of Black population and party control, although the mixed pattern 
of signs and significance levels has no obvious explanation.   
 The proportion of senior citizens was expected to have a negative and significant 
coefficient.  I find these results in most cases, suggesting that senior citizens compete with the 
poor for program funds.  The small coefficients imply that the proportion of senior citizens 
explains benefit differences across states more than within them, since cross-sectional variation 
is large but within-state change is quite slow. 
The final political variables represent the year within the governor's term.  If there are 
political business cycles in state spending, welfare benefits may rise in the year preceding the 
gubernatorial election year.  These variables have the expected negative coefficient for years 2 
and 3 of the governor's term, but are significant in the final year as well.  The implied political 
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cycle is that of larger budgets in the first year followed by slower welfare spending every year 
after.  This is not consistent with governors attempting to buy votes from the poor. 
Budgetary-control Variables 
 Across all models, I find the three budgetary-control variables to have sizable impacts on 
welfare benefits.   They support the theory that greater gubernatorial power--in the form of a 
line-item veto and the ability to unilaterally reduce appropriations bills--leads to substantially 
lower welfare benefits.  This may reflect unobserved state factors variously described as 
'political culture' or 'ideology' as in Wright and others (1987).   If  so, then state fixed effects 
should reduce these to statistical insignificance.  To date, however, there is insufficient variation 
across time to test this hypothesis.  Over the period 1979-1995, two of the variables are fixed and 
so drop out once state effects are added.  The remaining variable--the ability to carry over 
deficits--keeps its positive sign but falls dramatically and loses statistical significance.   
 
VI.  Extensions 
 
  This section presents two extensions that further test the link between welfare migration 
and spatial spillovers in benefits.13    
 Smaller states should be more sensitive to welfare migration than large ones, all else 
equal, since an equal number of migrants will have a greater relative fiscal impact.   
 In the previous models estimated with population weights, larger states' benefits were given 
more weight than smaller states' benefits.  Here I allow states with smaller populations to have 
separate spillover coefficients. If the smaller states have positive coefficients on the spillover 
                                                          
13 The results of each, not shown here, are available on request. 
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variable for lower-benefit neighbors that are larger than the coefficients for larger states, the 
welfare migration theory will gain support.   
 Because the definition of 'small' is arbitrary, I test two population groups.  The first 
contains states whose populations in a given year are less than one-half of the 17-year average of 
all 47 states (μ = 5.2 million).  There are 15-19 states in this group depending on the year.  The 
second group includes states with populations up to one-quarter of the 17-year average; 10-12 
states fall here each year.  Appendix A lists the members of each group. 
 The models modify equation (3.1') by the addition of interaction terms between the 
spatial terms and the low-population-state dummy.  For example, equation (4) illustrates a model 
that includes state fixed effects and defines low-population states (LPS25) by the more restrictive 
definition: 
 
 (4)   Bs,t   =  βXs,t-1  +  ρL1WLBs',t-1  +   ρH1WHBs',t-1   +   ρL2LPS25WLBs',t-1   
+   ρH2LPS25WHBs',t-1   +  γtt  +   δss   +   εs,t 
 
All of these models utilize population weights in matrix W.  As before, the errors are assumed to 
be heteroskedastic across states and to exhibit first-order autocorrelation.   The goal is to 
determine the signs and magnitudes of the new spillover coefficients ρL2 and ρH2. 
 I find the lower-benefit spillover terms to have small, positive coefficients that rise as 
expected for low-population states.  Together they are significantly only in the model with the 
more inclusive definition of low population.  The coefficients on higher- 
benefit neighbors are also positive but become negative and significant when interacted with the 
low-population dummy.   This suggests that smaller states react more strongly to neighbors' 
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benefits, as expected, but the opposing signs do not yield a single conclusion.  Altogether, the 
results of this model do not support the theory that welfare migration is a major determinant of 
welfare benefits. 
 State legislators may instead be concerned about the total number of migrants and not the 
relative number.  This possibility is addressed in the second extension.  Frey and others (1995) 
collated the 1990 Census migration data by income group, dividing migrants into those above 
and below the poverty line.  They determine three groups: those states with the greatest net loss 
of poor people; those with the greatest net gain of poor people; and those with the greatest net 
gain of nonpoor people.14   In the final model I allow each of these state groups to have a 
separate set of spatial spillover coefficients.  I expect net gainers and net losers of the poor to act 
differently, with the former group being most sensitive to neighboring states' benefits.  
Comparing net gainers of the poor to net gainers of nonpoor, I again expect the former group to 
be more sensitive.  If F-tests reveal no statistically significant difference among these, it would 
tend to contradict the theory that welfare migration concerns are substantially determining 
welfare benefits.   A single model is estimated, similar to equation (3.1'), with population-
based weights but without state fixed effects.  Dropping state effects allows estimation of  
dummy variables for each state group.  I also drop the Southeast dummy, since it overlaps 
considerably with the dummy representing poor-population gainers.    
In order to avoid potential endogeneity between population flows and benefit levels, I 
limit the data to the period 1991-1995, the years following the data collection.   
The resulting short panel precludes correction for autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity in the 
errors, since five observations per state is too few for reliable estimation of the necessary 
                                                          
14Not all states could be included.  See Appendix 2.B for the members of each group. 
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parameters.  The overall effect is to increase the likelihood of insignificant coefficients.  It may 
also lead to large spillover coefficients, since the iterative process used for other models tends to 
reduce the original estimates from two-state least squares.   
 The results again do not support the purported link between welfare migration and state 
welfare benefits.  Considering states gaining poor population versus those gaining nonpoor 
population, I find that the spatial spillover coefficients are significantly different from each other 
in both cases.  This is surprising since the two groups could have overlapped by six states (see 
Appendix B.2, note 2).  States that gain poor population in theory ought to be concerned about 
welfare benefits in lower-benefit neighbors, but in fact their spillover coefficient is insignificant.  
Moreover, the coefficients for poor-population gainers are smaller than for nonpoor gainers, the 
opposite of what the welfare migration theory would suggest.  
 Comparing gainers and losers of poor population , I again find that coefficients differ 
substantially across the groups.  In this case the pattern better fits the welfare migration theory, 
since gainers of the poor are more sensitive to neighbors'  benefits that gainers of the nonpoor.   
 In sum, the two extensions presented in this section do not support the theory that  
fears of welfare migration, whether inspired by actual population flows or by relative  
state populations, are exerting a substantial effect on welfare benefits. 
VII.  Conclusion  
 
 Most discussion of an impending “race to the bottom” has taken place in the context of 
the funding status of AFDC (Scheve and others, 1996).  Federal support for AFDC has turned 
from open-ended matching to a closed-end block grant, leaving states to bear the entire cost of 
the marginal dollar of benefits.  This adds new pressure to lower the number of welfare 
recipients.  The analysis presented here suggests that although there may be some spillover in the 
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setting of AFDC benefits, it is not substantial.  In addition, I find that states seem to treat higher- 
and lower-benefit neighbors similarly.  Both of these results suggest that we should not expect 
benefit levels to fall due to legislators' fears of welfare migration. 
 My research confirms earlier findings that economic and demographic factors like per-
capita income and the percentage of Blacks play a significant role in welfare policy.  Employing 
a more extensive array of political and budgetary factors than others have, I also find strong 
evidence that political party control has a substantial impact, both alone and interacted with 
regional and demographic factors. 
 One question that remains is whether previous patterns of benefit setting will continue 
now that federal funding has moved to a block-grant system.  In the next  recession when state 
experience deficits instead of the current widespread surpluses,  politicians may become more 
sensitive to the possibility of welfare migration and its attendant costs.   Another possibility is 
that states may choose to raise spending on other aspects of the welfare system, such as child 
care, while allowing benefits to continue falling.  Finally, the new freedom that states enjoy to 
determine their welfare plans should lend increasing importance to policy leadership among 
states.  Future research should consider, for example, how the professionalism of state 
legislatures affects the likelihood that they actively seek guidance from other states instead of 





    2SLS Model of Monthly Welfare Benefits With Two Spatial Effects  
 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Fixed Effects None None Percent Black * Percent -1.50 -1.70 
    Dem't -Lower House  (1.20) (1.50) 
Weighting Scheme Equal Population    
   Southeastern State   -28.4 140. 
Benefit Average: Lower  -.096 .047  (1.03) (7.08) 
 Benefit States (ρL) (2.88) (2.08)    
    South * Democrat .053 -52.8 
Benefit Average: Higher .008 .011  Control (.586) (4.82) 
   Benefit States (ρH) (.325) (.509)    
   South * Divided Control .053 -25.0 
Per-Capita Income -7.25 -1.77  (.620) (2.31) 
 ($100s) (2.80) (1.01)    
   South * Percent   -1.79 -.451 
Per-Capita Income2  34.7 4.11 Democrat-Upper House (6.96) (2.48) 
(x 1000-1) (2.69) (.477)    
   South * Percent -.306 -1.25 
Per-Capita Income3 -45.0 6.71  Democrat - Lower House (.825) (6.58) 
 (x 1,000,000-1) (2.15) (.475)    
   Percent Over Age 65 (%) -.195 -.161 
Unemployment (%)  2.93 -1.63  (.271) (.265) 
  (4.01) (4.57)    
   No Line-Item Veto 22.0 -101. 
Per-Capita Debt-to- 19.3 20.2  (2.28) (12.4) 
  Income Ratio   (7.02) (11.8)    
   Carryover Expected 25.0 30.7 
Democrat Government 3.06 .863   Deficit (6.28) (7.26) 
 (.658) (.219)    
   Governor Can Reduce -113. -95.8 
Divided Government 5.18 12.6   Appropriations Bills (20.2) (16.5) 
 (1.52) (3.77)    
   Political Cycle - Year 2 -1.27 .347 
Percent Democrats -    1.10 .436  (.961) (.342) 
  Upper House (%) (5.29) (2.72)    
   Political Cycle - Year 3 -1.51 -.649 
Percent Democrats - .527 .843  (1.01) (3.44) 
  Lower House (%) (2.40) (4.19)    
   Political Cycle - Year 4 1.50 .607 
Percent Black (%) 1.29 .908  (1.06) (.707) 
 (2.71) (2.03)    
   F-test of Joint      
Percent Black *  -.376 .323   Significance of Income 84.4 49.3 
  Democrat  Control (1.59) (1.46)   Variables   
      
Percent Black *  -.414 -.649 F-test of Difference    
  Divided Control (2.61) (3.44)   Between ρL and ρH 2.76 .394 
      
Percent Black * Percent .250 .607    




    FGLS Model of Monthly Welfare Benefits With Two Spatial Effects  
 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
   Percent Black * Percent .049 .002 
Fixed Effects None None   Democrat - Upper House (.050) (.231) 
      
Weighting Scheme Equal Pop'n Percent Black * Percent -.014 -.015 
      Democrat - Lower House (1.17) (1.19) 
      
Weighted Benefit Average: -.008 .018 Southeastern State   -3.05 -8.76 
Lower-Benefit States  (ρL) (.376) (.930)  (.111) (.316) 
      
Weighted  Benefit Average:  .049 .016 South * Democrat Control .456 .051 
Higher-Benefit States (ρH) (1.95) (.659)  (.050) (.006) 
      
Per-Capita Income -8.36 -8.27 South * Divided Control 1.14 2.13 
 ($100s) (3.21) (3.19)  (.134) (.252) 
      
Per-Capita Income2  39.5 39.1 South * Percent Democrat -1.78 -1.74 
(x 1000-1) (3.07) (3.05)   - Upper House (6.98) (6.80) 
      
Per-Capita Income3 -51.8 -51.5 South * Percent Democrat -.597 -.564 
 (x 1,000,000-1) (2.50) (2.48)  - Lower House (1.63) (1.53) 
      
Unemployment (%)  2.73 2.74 Percent Over Age 65 (%) -.780 -.957 
  (3.81) 93.81)  (1.10) (1.33) 
      
Per-Capita Debt-to- 20.0 20.6 No Line-Item Veto 19.2 18.4 
  Income Ratio   (7.37) (7.58)  (2.02) (1.91) 
      
Democrat Government 2.79 3.27 Carryover Expected 22.4 22.4 
 (.615) (.721)   Deficit (5.84) (5.85) 
      
Divided Government 8.04 7.81 Governor Can Reduce -110. -110. 
 (2.37) (2.32)   Appropriations Bills (19.4) (19.5) 
      
Percent Democrats -    1.10 1.05 Political Cycle - Year 2 -.644 -.796 
  Upper House (%) (5.43) (5.18)  (.487) (.602) 
      
Percent Democrats - .604 .662 Political Cycle - Year 3 -1.14 -1.37 
  Lower House (%) (2.80) (3.08)  (.763) (.914) 
      
Percent Black (%) 1.15 1.09 Political Cycle - Year 4 1.66 1.59 
 (2.41) (2.30)  (1.16) (1.11) 
      
Percent Black * Democrat -.175 -.224 F-test of Joint Significance    
  Control (.747) (.956)   of Income Variables 85.2 82.4 
      
Percent Black * Divided -.394 -.413 F-test of Difference    
  Control (2.50) (2.62)   Between ρL and ρH .815 .002 




FGLS Model of Welfare Benefits With Separate Spatial Effects  
and Geographic Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fixed Effects Region Region State State 
     
Weighting Scheme Equal Population Equal Population 
     
Weighted Benefit Average: .025 .024 .004 .008 
Lower-Benefit States  (ρL) (1.00) (1.08) (.529) (1.12) 
     
Weighted  Benefit Average:  .042 .035 .012 .020 
Higher-Benefit States (ρH) (1.86) (1.64) (.825) (1.46) 
     
Per-Capita Income -2.41 -2.58 -5.44 -5.39 
 ($100s) (1.01) (1.07) (2.15) (2.13) 
     
Per-Capita Income2  6.23 7.05 19.9 19.6 
(x 1000-1) (.544) (.611) (1.59) (1.57) 
     
Per-Capita Income3 .400 -.791 -17.2 -16.8 
 (x 1,000,000-1) (.022) (.044) (.849) (.829) 
     
Unemployment (%)  1.44 1.45 -1.30 -1.27 
  (2.33) (2.33) (2.98) (2.98) 
     
Per-Capita Debt-to-Income -8.62 -8.05 -8.48 -8.81 
  Ratio   (2.39) (2.24) (3.18) (3.32) 
     
Democrat Government 4.72 4.47 1.81 1.50 
 (1.08) (1.02) (.429) (.356) 
     
Divided Government -5.88 -5.82 6.07 5.87 
 (2.03) (2.01) (2.33) (2.27) 
     
Percent Democrats -    .823 .842 .232 .251 
  Upper House (%) (4.67) (4.77) (1.56) (1.70) 
     
Percent Democrats - -.610 -.625 .334 .328 
  Lower House (%) (3.29) (3.37) (1.78) (1.75) 
     
Percent Black (%) -.747 -.779 .436 .487 
 (1.61) (1.67) (1.23) (1.38) 
     
Percent  Black * Democrat .772 .755 .571 .584 
  Control (3.45) (3.36) (2.89) (2.96) 
     
Percent Black * Divided .375 .355 -.065 -.055 
  Control (2.73) (2.58) (.491) (.421) 
     
Percent Black * Percent -.021 -.020 .003 .002 
  Democrat - Upper House (2.42) (2.36) (.310) (.234) 
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Table 3, cont'd 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percent Black * Percent .019 .019 -.014 -.015 
  Democrat - Lower House (1.98) (2.02) (1.62) (1.66) 
     
Southeastern State     
     
     
South * Democrat Control -36.4 -35.9 -37.0 -37.1 
 (4.63) (4.55) (4.83) (4.85) 
     
South * Divided Control -9.70 -9.31 -3.07 -2.87 
 (1.40) (1.33) (.430) (.403) 
     
South * Percent Democrat -.584 -.592 -.319 -.334 
 - Upper House (2.43) (2.44) (1.84) (1.94) 
     
South * Percent Democrat .313 .309 -.495 -.456 
 - Lower House (1.11) (1.09) (2.40) (2.21) 
     
Percent Over Age 65 (%) -3.03 -2.96 -3.53 -3.66 
 (4.45) (4.34) (4.90) (5.11) 
     
No Line-Item Veto -4.31 -3.56   
 (.396) (.325)   
     
Carryover Expected -11.1 -11.0 3.57 3.79 
  Deficit (2.96) (2.93) (.620) (.659) 
     
Governor Can Reduce -137. -138.   
  Appropriations Bills (19.2) (19.6)   
     
Political Cycle - Year 2 -3.51 -3.62 -3.68 -3.58 
 (2.31) (2.37) (2.80) (2.74) 
     
Political Cycle - Year 3 -5.75 -5.85 -2.86 -2.99 
 (3.56) (3.62) (2.12) (2.22) 
     
Political Cycle - Year 4 -5.64 -5.71 -2.55 -2.48 
 (3.61) (3.65) (1.94) (1.90) 
     
F-test of Joint Significance       
  of Income Variables 14.0* 14.3* 36.4* 36.3* 
     
F-test of Difference      
  Between ρL and ρH .090 .040 .031 .086 
     
R2 .965 .966 .970 .970 
* Significant at the 99-percent confidence level   
Notes   
a. Absolute value of t-statistics shown in parentheses.  All models contain year fixed effects; models (3) 
and (4) also contain a constant term.   




    Spatial Autocorrelation Coefficients Across Models, By Weighting Scheme 
 
 
4.A    Weights Proportional to State Population 
 
 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 3 
Neighbors' Benefits Treated As: exogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous 
     
Fixed Effects: none none region   state  
     
     
Weighted Benefit Average: .047 .018 .024 .008 
Lower-Benefit States  (ρL) (2.08) (.930) (1.08) (1.12) 
     
Weighted  Benefit Average:  .011 .016 .035 .020 
Higher-Benefit States (ρH) (.509) (.659) (1.64) (1.46) 
     




4.B    Equal Weights  
 
 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 3 
Neighbors' Benefits Treated As: exogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous 
     
Fixed Effects: none none region   state  
     
     
Weighted Benefit Average: -.096 -.008 .025 .004 
Lower-Benefit States  (ρL) (2.88) (.376) (1.00) (.529) 
     
Weighted  Benefit Average:  .008 .049 .042 .012 
Higher-Benefit States (ρH) (.325) (1.95) (1.86) (.825) 
     








Partial Effect of Changes in 1994 Independent Variables on 1995 Own-State Benefits 
for Selected States 
 
 
5.A    .Rise in Neighbors' Benefits 
 
 Average 1994 Benefits             
in Neighbors With  
Impact of 5% Rise in Average 1994 Benefits 
[Implied Elasticity] 1  
 Lower Benefits Higher Benefits without State Effects with State Effects 
     
State     
     
Illinois 648.52 723.11 $ 1.16   $ 0.68   
   [.03] [.02] 
     
Iowa 624.43 710.96 $ 1.13   $ 0.96  
   [.03] [.03] 
     
Wisconsin 702.44 723.89 $  1.21 $ 1.00  
   [.03] [.03] 
     
Nat'l Average 622.04 716.59 $  1.13 $ 0.97  
   [.03] [.03] 
 
 
5.B     Rise in Own-State Per Capita Income 
 
  1994 Income Impact on 1995 Benefits of a 1% Rise in Real Income    
[Implied Elasticity] 1 
  Model with No State or   
Region Fixed Effects 
Model with  
State Fixed Effects 
State    
    
Illinois 24,368 $ 3.73 $ 2.89 
  [.55] [.43] 
    
Iowa 20,915 $ 2.80 $ 1.30 
  [.39] [.18] 
    
Wisconsin 21,686 $ 3.11 $ 1.65 
  [.40] [.21] 
    
Nat'l Average 21,277 $ 2.95 $ 1.46 
   [.44] [.22] 
 
Notes 
1Figures based on Table 2, col. 2 and Table 3, col. 4 
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Appendix A.1  
 
Data - Definitions 
 
AFDC + Food Stamps:  the maximum monthly combined benefit of AFDC plus Food Stamps for 
a family of three with no other income, in real (1995) dollars, by state and year.a The family is 
assumed to have no other countable income, but to have the full deductions allowed under the 
Food Stamp program.  See House of Representatives (1994). 
 
Per-Capita Income: the average per-capita personal income, in hundreds of real (1995)   
dollars, by state and yeara 
 
Unemployment: the unemployment rate, by state and yeara 
 
Percent of Blacks: the percentage of Blacks in total state population, by state and yeara 
 
Percent Age 65 and Over: the percentage of state residents aged 65 and over, by state and   
yeara 
 
Democrat Government: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the governor is a Democrat and   
both houses of the state legislature have Democrat majorities.a,d 
 
Divided Government: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Democratic party controls either the 
governship or both houses of the legislature while Republicans control the  other, or vice 
versa.  (Note that all non-Democrats are counted as Republicans.) a,d 
 
Percent Democrat in Lower (Upper) House: percentage of Democrats (including    
Independents) in the lower (upper) house of the state legislature, by yeare 
 
Line-Item Veto: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the governor does not have a line-item   
veto, by state and yeare  
 
 
Governor Can Reduce Appropriations Bills: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the governor   
can reduce items in appropriations bills and governor has a line-item veto, by   state 
and yeare  
 
State Can Carryover Expected Deficits: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state may   
carry over anticipated deficits into the next fiscal year, by state and yeare,f,g 
 
Per-capita Debt-to-Income Ratio: per-capita total state debt divided by per-capita person   
income, by state and yeara,e   
 
 
Appendix A.1, cont'd  
 33
 
Gubernatorial Cycle: the year of the governor’s term; omitted is Year 1, the first year   
following the election year; by state and yeare 
 
Southeastern States:  Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, North   
Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, West Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky. 
 
Sources 
aStatistical Abstract of the United States  
bSome data were downloaded from the website of the Administration for Children and Families, 
Department of Health and Human Services:www.acf.dhhs.gov 
cCAWP Fact Sheet: Women in State Legislatures  
dAlamanac of the 50 States  
eThe Book of the States  
fStanley and Niemi (1992), pp. 325-326 
gACIR. Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1992, 1994, 1995 eds.; Bohn and Inman 
(1996), Table 2 
hACIR. Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1994 ed., Table 98 
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Appendix  A.2 
 
Data - Descriptive Statistics1 
 
  
                   Without State Fixed Effects     With State Fixed Effects 
                                                        
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
AFDC + Food Stamps ($) 737.55 134.47  0 66.87 
Per-Capita Income  ($100’s) 193.82 29.16 0 20.00 
Per-Capita Income2  x 10-3 38.42 11.96 0 8.25 
Per-Capita Income3  x 10-6 7.79 3.80 0 2.65 
Unemployment Rate  (%) 6.64 2.11 0 1.66 
Democrat Government   .349 .477 0 .342 
Divided Government   .343 .475 0 .428 
Percent Democrat in Lower 
     House (%) 
59.44 18.34 0 43.39 
Percent Democrat in Upper 
     House (%) 
60.92 19.01 0 5.60 
Percent Black  (%) 11.10 12.10 0 9.18 
Percent Age 65 and Over  (%) 11.38 3.36 0 2.98 
Debt-to-Income Ratio  .850 .587 0 .193 
Line-Item Veto2    .149 .356 -- --- 
Carry Over Expected Deficits  .299 .458 0 .193 
Governor May Reduce Bills2   .192 .394 -- ---    
Gubernatorial Cycle - Year 2   .278 .448 0 .434 
Gubernatorial Cycle - Year 3   .214 .410 0 .399 
Gubernatorial Cycle - Year 4   .247 .431 0 .419 
Southeastern State .234 .424 -- --- 
     




1All dollars figures are in real 1995 dollars. 













I.  Definitions of Low-Population State Groups 
 
.25 * mean population               .50 * mean population 
 
Northeast:  Delaware    Delaware 
   Maine     Maine 
   New Hampshire   Michigan* 
   Rhode Island    New Hampshire 
   Vermont    Rhode Island 
        Vermont 
 
Southeast:      (none)     West Virginia 
 
Northwest:  Idaho     Idaho 
   Montana    Kansas* 
  North Dakota    Montana 
   South Dakota    North Dakota 
   Wyoming    Oregon* 
        South Dakota 
        Utah 
        Wyoming 
 
Southwest:  Nevada*    Arizona* 
   New Mexico*    Arkansas 
        Nevada 
        New Mexico 
 
* this state does not appear in the group in every year 
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II. Definitions of  State Migration Groups   
(in descending order of total net migration, by category) 
 
 
Poor-Population Net Losers1 : New York, Illinois, Texas, New Jersey, California,  
Louisiana, Connecticut, Wyoming   
 
Poor-Population Net Gainers : Florida, North Carolina, Washington, Arizona, Georgia,  
Oregon, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Missouri, Alabama 
 




1Alaska and Hawaii are eliminated because they do not appear in my data. 
 
2The remaining six of the top ten are eliminated because they also appear in the  
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